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Introduction
Advocates for big data argue that more is different: as the 
amount and complexity of data available to a field increase 
by several orders of magnitude, radical changes become 
appropriate in scientific methodology (Anderson 2008; Hey 
et al. 2009; Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013). The slo-
gan suggests that entering a new era of data-driven science 
is primarily a matter of scaling up the quantity of data 
available to a field: how one gets the data matters less than 
how much one collects. In contrast, critics have argued that 
the value of an aggregated dataset cannot be reliably sepa-
rated from how its component parts were produced (boyd 
and Crawford 2012; Lazer et al. 2014; Leonelli 2014; Meng 
2014).1 In particular, the process of aggregating data at 
increasing scale contains common pitfalls at various stages 
that can undermine the robustness of the data’s value across 
contexts of reuse. In other words, each dataset undergoes 
its own journey from production to reuse (Leonelli 2016), 
and the details of these journeys matter for the outcome of 
the larger transformation the field undergoes as scientists 
scale up their data.
Given that process matters, how should scientists design 
their data infrastructures and practices in order to anticipate 
and overcome pitfalls in aggregation? While critics of the 
big data movement have argued for the difficulty of making 
data travel meaningfully across situations, we are still in 
need of systematic, positive alternatives to the naïve hope 
1 We use “data aggregation” to refer to merging multiple sets of data 
of the same kind (e.g., multiple collections of specimens or multi-
ple runs of the same experiment) as distinct from “data integration,” 
which refers to combining multiple kinds of data to solve an inference 
problem (Berman 2013). The limits of this distinction, where aggre-
gation and integration become hard to tell apart, are an important 
topic outside the scope of this article.
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that adding more data will make any problem go away. For 
example, when is it better to deal with aggregation errors 
by developing a more precise, universal system of identi-
fiers for data versus multiple systems specialized to differ-
ent needs that are only partially consistent? We argue that 
there are pragmatic trade-offs between precision and ambi-
guity in the underlying syntax of identifier schemes that 
have important consequences for the design of solutions 
to aggregating biodiversity data in systematic biology. We 
introduce a framework for articulating these trade-offs that 
draws on recent research in cognitive pragmatics (Pianta-
dosi et al. 2012).
In general, the theory-dependence of scientific data 
poses a persistent problem for a single solution to storing 
and accessing meaningful sets of scientific data. In this arti-
cle we focus specifically on the problem for data semantics 
posed by the project of aggregating datasets that describe 
biological specimens preserved in collections across the 
world. When taxonomists aggregate primary specimen data 
into supposedly coherent evolutionary entities using taxo-
nomic names, they rely on hypotheses about the nature of 
these entities that may conflict across specimen collections. 
That is, even when taxonomists recognize the same valid 
name string (or synonymy relationship between names), 
they regularly subscribe to different hypotheses about the 
evolutionary identity and definitional boundaries of the 
name’s referent, which means they also often disagree 
about how to categorize new specimens or other data under 
existing taxonomic names. To put it another way, they asso-
ciate conflicting taxonomic concepts with the same name, 
which means they disagree over what gets included in the 
taxon as a set of organisms.2 The semantics of specimen 
data is therefore theory-dependent on taxonomic classifica-
tions, which themselves regularly conflict across research 
groups and time (Franz et  al. 2015, 2016a, b; Witteveen 
2015a; Remsen 2016).
Having recognized the theory-dependence of specimen 
data as a source of aggregation error, one response may be 
that biodiversity data is not a good candidate for big data 
projects. The contextuality and instability of taxonomic 
nomenclature simply demands too much human curation 
of data for scaling up to be worthwhile. Nevertheless, there 
are imperative reasons for building comprehensive biodi-
versity data environments, such as the need to establish an 
information system reflecting current perspectives on the 
2 A taxonomic concept is a description of what a taxonomic name 
refers to as stated by a particular author in a particular publication. 
A taxonomic concept can be defined in terms of rules for appropriate 
use (an intensional definition), by a set of organisms included under 
the concept (an extensional definition), or by a mixture of these two 
approaches.
geographic ranges of species in order to track the effects of 
climate change.
Indeed, big biodiversity data is effectively already here, 
emerging out of three major sources: the digitization of 
likely three billion specimens housed in museum collec-
tions and other institutions (Rogers 2016), the digitization 
of published monographs and texts from the past several 
hundred years that provide or revise taxonomic classifica-
tions (Page 2016), and the industrial-scale production of 
new data associated from other fields of biology, such as 
genomics. Rapid and affordable sequencing has enabled 
phylogenetic systematists to pursue building a universal 
tree of life (Hinchcliff et  al. 2015), but reaching this goal 
depends on extensive prior knowledge about the lower-level 
entities that must be sampled and analyzed. There would be 
clear value to having all these forms of data linked together 
and made easily available from on-line databases, but this 
poses an immense challenge for biodiversity informatics.
We argue for a broader understanding of big data that 
focuses attention on its long-term outcomes across a 
diverse array of cases. To this end, we introduce the con-
cept of a “big data trajectory” as the process by which a 
field changes the collective set of available data sufficiently 
to motivate major changes and new problems in existing 
research. A big data trajectory generally involves aggregat-
ing the results of multiple, and sometimes many, individual 
data journeys. From this broader perspective, the theory-
dependence of data becomes a central factor in the success 
or failure of any community attempting to scale up its data.
There are currently two major strategies for addressing 
how to manage specimen data across multiple classification 
systems (Remsen 2016): syntactic (extending the internal 
grammar of nomenclature) and pragmatic (extending our 
knowledge about the modes and contexts of people’s use 
of nomenclature). Some taxonomists, for example, have 
advocated for extending the syntax of taxonomic names 
to include a reference to an authoritative publication that 
explicitly defines the taxon concept being invoked (Ber-
endsohn 1995). This solution can be directly implemented 
into current and future databases so that users are required 
to supply an explicit taxon concept label in order to enter 
new data. Several taxonomic publications, software pro-
jects, and databases have adopted Berendsohn’s (1995) 
expanded syntax and implemented it to identify and track 
taxonomic concepts (e.g., Koperski et al. 2000; Pullan et al. 
2000, 2005; Lepage et al. 2014; Franz et al. 2015, 2016a, 
b; Jansen and Franz 2015; Cui et al. 2016). Incorporating 
the historical published literature poses a major challenge 
for this approach, however, because biologists have typi-
cally provided limited explicit guidance in their writings 
about what taxonomic concepts they have in mind for each 
instance of a name. Taken to the extreme, following Ber-
endsohn’s (1995) syntactic approach would require one to 
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infer a taxononomic concept for each token use of each tax-
onomic name in the published literature.
This practical challenge for Berendsohn’s (1995) 
approach reflects a deeper relationship between the syntac-
tic and pragmatic approaches that arises from the different 
cognitive demands that humans and computers place on 
the functioning of taxonomic names. We show, for exam-
ple, how biologists use names as metonyms to symbolize 
a variety of different objects, including type specimens, 
taxon concepts, and even historical progressions of taxon 
concepts. Such ambiguity of usage poses a major obsta-
cle for making scientific discourse intelligible to machines 
because it exceeds, for example, even the expressive capac-
ity of Berendsohn’s (1995) extended syntax. For human 
readers with the appropriate expertise, however, ambigu-
ity can increase efficiency by allowing taxonomists to re-
use the same name for multiple purposes and in multiple 
contexts of scientific inquiry. There are thus important 
trade-offs involved in making scientific discourse intelli-
gible to computers; weighing these trade-offs explicitly in 
relation to their underlying causes will better position the 
field to succeed than embracing the view that data aggre-
gation works well enough without careful methodologi-
cal guidance. We examine the merits of the syntactic and 
pragmatic strategies in terms of the trade-offs they make for 
how names can function as cognitive tools for coordinat-
ing research and facilitating communication across research 
groups and related organizations (Star and Griesemer 1989; 
Bowker 2000; Gerson 2008).
Big Data Trajectories and the Pitfalls 
of Aggregation
In general, “big data” evokes an optimism about progress: 
getting more data will make things better in the long run, 
even if it poses serious problems in the short run that 
require ongoing research and resources. Attempts to char-
acterize big data in more detail have typically focused on 
producing theoretical definitions: claims that particular 
tools, methods, aims, or conditions are core to what makes 
big data. For example, big data is sometimes characterized 
in terms of the absolute number of data points, such as the 
billions of nucleotides produced by genome sequencing or 
the exabytes of data produced by telescopes in astronomy, 
along with the velocity (i.e., rate) and variety of data at 
issue (Laney 2001). Others focus on how scaling up data 
collection leads to demands for new technological infra-
structure to handle all the data processing and storage 
(Hey et al. 2009), new data-driven analytical methods (Hey 
et al. 2009; Sepkoski 2012; Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 
2013; Meng 2014), acquiring truly complete datasets (Hut-
ter and Moerman 2015), or transformation in social norms 
and career pathways (Strasser 2011; Lagoze 2014; Leonelli 
2014).
Perhaps the most radical claim made on behalf of big 
data is that it renders previous scientific methods obsolete 
(Anderson 2008; Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013). 
For instance, traditional concerns about random sampling 
and careful statistical analysis will be alleviated by having 
datasets that are complete, i.e., which include measure-
ments made on every entity of interest in a domain. Com-
mon examples of “complete” datasets would include whole 
genome sequences or an exhaustive gene network that rep-
resents every causal interaction between pairs of genes in a 
cell.
We suggest it is more fruitful not to provide a single 
theoretical definition for several reasons. The most basic 
reason is that big data is still developing and expanding 
quite rapidly, so it is far from clear whether it has some 
determinate character at this point. Indeed, a second point 
is that big data is so popular in part because what it means 
is highly flexible, and it is a trendy topic for research fund-
ing or new business opportunities. Trying to give a precise 
definition for the phrase would direct our attention away 
from a key factor in its growth. Finally, attempting a sin-
gle theoretical definition may obscure important complexi-
ties connecting the activity of generating large amounts of 
new data to changes in the epistemic tools and culture of a 
community. For example, it is unlikely that all disciplines 
involved in big data will sign up for the transformation of 
the scientific method advertised by Mayer-Schönberger and 
Cukier (2013), but Leonelli (2014, p. 9) suggests that “the 
real revolution seems more likely to centre on other areas 
of social life, particularly economics and politics, where 
the widespread use of patterns extracted from large data-
sets as evidence for decision-making is a relatively recent 
phenomenon.” It is more important to analyze and explain 
these different outcomes of scaling up data than to focus 
only on the most radical cases.
As an alternative, we characterize big data using the idea 
of a “big data trajectory,” which refers to the activities of a 
group of researchers who (1) set out to change the collec-
tive set of data available to address one or more shared 
problems of interest in such a way that (2) the researchers 
believe existing methods or resources available to the group 
are not adequate for the project and (3) they believe acquir-
ing these methods or resources poses specific research 
problems separate from the original problems of shared 
interest.3 Our emphasis on the trajectory of the researchers’ 
activities is intended to highlight the sequence of decisions, 
obstacles, achievements, and outcomes they encounter 
3 For more on the concept of trajectory as a tool for comparative 
research in the social sciences, see Strauss (1993).
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during their project. In general, the idea serves as a nomi-
nal definition, i.e., it provides operational criteria for identi-
fying cases of big data without attempting to select certain 
properties as most fundamental or explanatory. The point 
of such a definition is to constitute a set of cases for com-
parative analysis based on a shared standard that minimizes 
the influence of theoretical preconceptions on our under-
standing of the phenomena at issue (cf. Griesemer 2012).
It is a virtue of this approach that our definition of big 
data trajectories will include a number of cases that are 
not conventionally labeled as big data since these cases 
often provide useful insight into what features make other 
cases paradigmatic by contrast. Indeed, one can argue 
that the underlying phenomenon named by “big data” has 
been around for centuries in science (Ogilvie 2003; Mül-
ler-Wille and Charmantier 2012; Aronova et  al. 2017). 
Although the absolute scale of information available today 
is unprecedented, the experience of a large relative increase 
in information is not new. For example, the large influx of 
new specimens that Europeans collected in the 1700s from 
around the world, many of which did not comfortably fit in 
existing taxonomies, drove Carl Linnaeus to formalize new 
taxonomic and nomenclatural practices in order to cope 
(Ogilvie 2003; Dietz 2012; Müller-Wille and Charmantier 
2012; Charmantier and Müller-Wille 2014).
Given a set of big data trajectories, the goal is to inves-
tigate similarities and differences among the cases in order 
to identify factors that influence how individual trajectories 
or classes of trajectories develop over time. In this article, 
we focus on the consequences of theory-dependence for the 
task of data aggregation. In general, big data trajectories 
involve aggregating data, in the sense of bringing together 
pieces of data of a relevantly similar type into one location, 
e.g., a single database. The promise of big data that more 
is better is not uniformly accessible: scientists have found 
data aggregation to be incredibly difficult and time-con-
suming in fields where data are regularly produced across 
multiple independent organizational contexts (Edwards 
et  al. 2011; Millerand et  al. 2013; Leonelli 2014). The 
production of metadata—higher-order data about what is 
contained in each dataset—is a complex process involving 
negotiation and cross-disciplinary expertise, but without 
metadata a collection of data items remains just a sequence 
of strings and numbers in a text file or table somewhere 
(Edwards et  al. 2011; Millerand et  al. 2013). It turns out 
that the value of achieving big data does depend on how 
one gets there (boyd and Crawford 2012; Lagoze 2014; 
Lazer et al. 2014; Leonelli 2014). “The data that are most 
successfully assembled into big collections [in biology] are 
genomic data, such as genome sequences and microarrays, 
which are produced through highly standardised technolo-
gies and are therefore easier to format for travel” (Leonelli 
2014, p. 5).
Figure  1 illustrates several key structural elements in 
data production processes that are loci for methodological 
pitfalls when it comes time to aggregate datasets. The post-
processing stage reflects the need to estimate likely sources 
of error or bias in the initial values reported by observ-
ing researchers or measurement instruments (e.g., Hoeppe 
2014). It may also be necessary to simplify a large data-
base down to manageable proportions (Suciu 2013; Meng 
2014). In this way, post-processing for some local use can 
eliminate signals or introduce biases that are relevant to 
answering other questions. Similarly, researchers or instru-
ments producing the same sort of data may differ in the 
profile of errors they make, return results at different lev-
els of precision, or even use incommensurable definitions 
of the “same” variable, such as spatial location (Shavit and 
Griesemer 2009, 2011).
Turning to sampling, there is no guarantee that a number 
of locally representative samplings will add up to a glob-
ally representative sample: datasets may partially overlap 
in coverage or have systemic gaps that were not relevant 
for their narrower uses. Finally, if users are missing meta-
data about any one of these aspects, this could render the 
aggregate dataset useless. Among other things, metadata 
provides a way of tracking the provenance of data back 
Fig. 1  Common structural 
elements in the process of 
data production. Each named 
element is an important source 
of methodological pitfalls that 
can lead to corruption or loss 
of value when scientists try to 
aggregate together datasets that 
were generated independently
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through their production processes and of validating ana-
lytical assumptions about their properties.
One way to come to grips with the limitations of big 
data is therefore to investigate how aggregating datasets can 
fail to significantly increase their value for some purpose 
compared to leveraging each dataset on its own. Thinking 
in terms of big data trajectories allows us to encompass 
the diversity of circumstances, aims, and means within the 
movement while tracking how this diversity influences the 
benefits that communities pursuing big data end up real-
izing. In the next section, we use taxonomic name-based 
data in systematic biology to illustrate how aggregation 
can fail when the domain assigned to a single data point (a 
vouchered specimen) is a matter of theoretical inference in 
its own right.
Theory‑Dependence in Biodiversity Data
Organisms preserved in museums or other collections are 
not much use to science unless they are identified as 
belonging to some taxon, usually at the species rank. How-
ever, definitions of species-level boundaries are scientific 
hypotheses,4 so taxonomists will often reasonably disagree 
on which specimens should be identified to which taxo-
nomic names. This means that aggregation necessarily 
involves more than placing an entry for each specimen 
record into a single database, since users typically request 
data by taxon name (or taxonomic concept label when 
available), or they request a list of specimens or taxa occur-
ring within a geographic region under a higher-level name. 
Aggregation is thus theory-dependent in the sense that the 
correct aggregation of specimens under a name will typi-
cally require explicit tracking of how specimens have been 
identified according to various hypotheses about natural 
entities. More ambitiously, a database could track the cor-
rect assignments of specimens for each hypothesis and offer 
the user the ability to compare them.
In this section, we illustrate the importance of tracking 
taxonomic concepts to aggregating biodiversity data in 
order to motivate the theoretical importance of trade-offs 
between precision and ambiguity in taxonomic nomencla-
ture. Despite the development of substantial databases and 
tools implementing the explicit tracking of taxonomic con-
cepts (Ciardelli et al. 2009; Lepage et al. 2014; Cui et al. 
2016), some experts continue to treat the issue as negligible 
or technically infeasible (e.g., Patterson et  al. 2016). Our 
4 Note that these hypotheses are about the nature of individual spe-
cies as entities, not the nature of biological species in general, which 
has been another source of ongoing debate among biologists and phi-
losophers.
discussion therefore aims to expand on recent arguments 
for the importance and tractability of incorporating taxo-
nomic concepts into biodiversity informatics.
Imagine you are the researcher responsible for building 
an on-line database that aggregates together records for all 
known specimens of one presumed species of grass, known 
by the valid taxonomic name Andropogon virginicus, along 
with any associated data published about the genomes, 
ecology, and other properties of the members of this entity. 
The ultimate goal is for each unique material specimen to 
have a single corresponding record in the database that 
includes all relevant information available about the speci-
men, including its taxonomic identification, date of collec-
tion, measured phenotypic or genetic properties, and geo-
graphic origin. For plants, a material specimen will often 
mean a pressed and dried cutting of one or more stems and 
leaves from an individual in the wild.5
The naïve solution would be to join together all records 
that link the name “A. virginicus”—coined by Linnaeus in 
1753—to a specimen or dataset. Unfortunately, you quickly 
discover that, even after restricting the aggregation to (1) 
just in the period of 1889–2015 and (2) the region of the 
Mid-Atlantic and Southern United States, there have been 
11 floristic and revisionary treatments that conflict over 
which organisms should be identified as A. virginicus or 
categorized as closely related under another name (Franz 
et  al. 2016a).6 Consequently, specimens used to describe 
the geographical range of A. virginicus as recognized in 
some hypothetical ecological study published in 1970 may 
no longer carry that name validly according to the most 
current classification today. Moreover, suppose that an 
influential flora for the region was published in 1968, yet 
the authors of the hypothetical study do not clearly indicate 
whether they are following this treatment or an incongruent 
earlier one (cf. Rosenberg 2014).
Certainly one cannot infer the relevant species mem-
bership of a specimen from the text string “A. virgin-
icus” alone, because this string remains constant across 
all taxonomic revisions. We can momentarily set aside 
the additional complications of synonyms and spelling 
errors (Remsen 2016), because these do not alter the fun-
damental theory-dependency of name strings as reliable 
aggregators (Franz et  al. 2016a). Perhaps some authors 
are careful enough to state which classification they are 
5 More generally, we also include vouchered occurrence records, 
such as image-vouchered observations or tissue samples not linked to 
physical specimen depositions, under our use of the term “specimen 
data.”
6 While some of these treatments may provide nomenclatural synon-
ymy information intended to resolve such conflicts, this information 
can nonetheless still be incomplete, incorrect, or out of date.
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using elsewhere in the publication, but this is more often 
the exception than the rule (Rosenberg 2014). Moreover, 
it turns out that many physical specimens were first identi-
fied and stored under prior classification schemes, and have 
not had their identifying name data updated since then (cf. 
Smith et al. 2016). So it looks as if building the database 
will routinely require you to sort through these ambiguities 
“by hand” for each data point used in thousands of papers 
and for hundreds of vouchered collections across institu-
tions (Goodwin et al. 2015).
Now recall that all this effort is devoted to aggregating 
specimen data for a single species-level name, and that the 
ultimate goal is to build this sort of database for all such 
names, i.e., for all reliably inferred and named sections of 
the tree of life (though see O’Malley 2013).7 Unfortunately, 
the reconciliation challenges posed by A. virginicus are not 
unusual across taxonomy (Franz et al. 2008). For instance, 
Geoffroy and Berendsohn (2003) found that 44.5% of the 
1548 taxonomic names listed as valid in a reference list of 
German mosses published in 2000 showed instability in 
their taxonomic circumscription over a 73-year time period. 
Furthermore, the usages of many names may appear stable 
7 Our argument in this article does not presuppose that named taxa 
are monophyletic groups, but we will set aside the debate over how to 
define biological species as a further complication that only magnifies 
the difficulty of meaningful classification of specimen data.
only because they have not received careful revision since 
their original definition (Remsen 2016).
How does this matter for data aggregation? If we count 
each specimen as a single datum, then what that datum 
is about is often a matter of theoretical dispute. In other 
words, taxonomic classifications reflect empirical hypoth-
eses about which living things in the world belong to which 
evolutionarily coherent taxa, such that disputes about the 
nature of taxa are in part disagreements about what names 
the specimens in some collection are properly associated 
with. The very assignment of data to a source domain is 
therefore a matter of theory-dependent inference.
In consequence, attempting to aggregate specimen col-
lections labeled under conflicting classifications can lead to 
pervasive errors in how data get assigned to sources. As one 
example of how errors can arise, consider a situation where 
two classifications agree on the boundaries of a group but 
disagree about how to partition it into species-level sub-
groups “A” and “B.” Now consider a specimen that clas-
sification 1 assigns to the species name A, but which under 
classification 2 would be identified to the species name B. 
If we aggregate specimen collections from the two collec-
tions based on the identifiers A and B, then neither set of 
specimens in the aggregate dataset will have a determinate 
taxonomic meaning.
To properly address the integration challenge, we would 
have to implement a solution similar to that shown in Fig. 2 
(cf. Franz 2016a). The names A. virginicus and Andropo-
gon glomeratus, as used in the respective classifications of 
Fig. 2  Representations of the semantic relations between three clas-
sifications—Blomquist (1948), Hitchcock and Chase (1950), and 
Radford, Ahles, and Bell (1968)—utilizing the name A. virginicus 
(adopted from Franz et  al. 2016a). a Tabular alignment of lowest-
level taxonomic concepts; each horizontal row corresponds to a 
congruent lineage of taxonomic concepts labeled with different but 
(locally) valid names. b Directed acyclical graph alignment visu-
alization (“meaning transition map”) of the three classifications, as 
logically inferred with the Euler/X multi-taxonomy alignment toolkit 
(Franz et al. 2015, 2016a, b). Taxonomic concept labels are abbrevi-
ated. Arrows symbolize inverse proper inclusion (<), whereas dashed 
lines indicate overlap (><). Regions with rounded corners symbolize 
congruent concept regions; whereas other regions with various (gray 
to white) shadings and either rectangular or octagonal shapes rep-
resent concepts unique to the respective input taxonomy (i.e., either 
1948, 1950, or 1968). Additional annotations: = congruent concepts, 
identical names; +: unique concept, unique name; − unique concept, 
non-unique name; * (a and b): low-level concept lineage congruent 
with A. virginicus var. tenuispatheus sec. Blomquist (1948), as sin-
gled out in the main text
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1948 and 1950, have taxonomically intersecting meanings 
of the sort ascribed to A and B above. The 1968 classifica-
tion in this example is less fine-grained than either of its 
predecessors. This could, for instance, mean that a speci-
men identified to the species-level name A. virginicus in 
1968 would be correctly assigned to the name A. glomera-
tus in 1950, and to the variety-level name A. virginicus var. 
tenuispatheus in 1948, even though the 1948 classification 
treats A. glomeratus as a valid species-level name whose 
referent excludes that of A. virginicus.
We briefly point out that biologists may propagate such 
conflicting taxonomic name usages even when they all 
agree on the ostensive definitions of the names under con-
sideration based on their nomenclatural type specimens 
(Witteveen 2015a, b).8 In other words, biologists may all 
agree that the selection of a type specimen for (e.g.) a spe-
cies-level name establishes a determinate fact of the matter 
about what the name designates; however, they may still 
disagree about what members in addition to the type speci-
men are included in the referent. In this regard, the inten-
sional circumscription (e.g., feature-based, differential 
diagnosis) that taxonomists offer along with the type speci-
men to delimit the name’s non-type reference serves as a 
scientific hypothesis about the taxon’s evolutionary iden-
tity. Operating under the premise that there is such an iden-
tity in itself is not sufficient to tell us which currently advo-
cated hypothesis (or hypotheses) among several competing 
options will be held as most valid in future taxonomic 
treatments.
Syntactic Solution: Explicit Tracking 
of Taxonomic Concepts
There are currently two main pathways available for resolv-
ing the source ambiguity for specimen data: syntactic and 
pragmatic (Remsen 2016). The former extends the internal 
grammar of taxonomic nomenclature in order to accom-
modate taxonomic concepts, whereas the latter leverages 
contextual information surrounding the usages of names in 
order to achieve more accurate resolutions of meaning. In 
order to understand the potential advantages and challenges 
of each strategy, we situate the problem in terms of ten-
sions between the distinctive cognitive abilities of humans 
and computers. A syntactic solution would have considera-
ble value for improving precision in future publications, but 
would fail to address the problem for legacy literature. As a 
consequence, there will be an ongoing need to develop new 
8 Interestingly, the type method is not mandatory above the family 
level where the codes of nomenclature have no regulatory power (cf. 
Franz and Thau 2010).
computational methods for incorporating pragmatic context 
into the semantic disambiguation of taxonomic names. This 
challenge offers an exciting and novel site for the intersec-
tion of informatics research in systematic biology and prac-
tice-oriented research in science studies.
A taxonomic concept reflects an empirical hypothesis on 
the part of the author about which organisms are in the 
taxon designated by the name. Taxonomic concepts are 
generally stated as a combination of intensional circum-
scriptions (i.e., descriptions) of the taxon’s properties and 
specifications of individual specimens or lower-level con-
cepts that match these properties. The idea to augment 
identifier resolution in biodiversity databases was formal-
ized by Berendsohn (1995), who proposed that labels for 
taxonomic concepts should utilize the syntax, [taxonomic 
name] [name author and citation] sec. [source], where the 
“sec.” stands for secundum (according to). An example of 
this syntactic convention would be “A. virginicus Linnaeus 
1753: 1046s. Blomquist (1948),” which can thereby be dif-
ferentiated from another taxonomic concept label “A. vir-
ginicus Linnaeus 1753: 1046s. Hitchcock and Chase 
(1950).”9
Several taxonomic publications and software projects 
have adopted Berendsohn’s (1995) expanded syntax and 
implemented it to identify and track taxonomic concepts 
(e.g., Koperski et al. 2000; Pullan et al. 2000, 2005; Franz 
et  al. 2015, 2016a, b; Jansen and Franz 2015; Cui et  al. 
2016). Avibase (Lepage et  al. 2014) is one of the most 
thorough and high-impact realizations, storing unique 
labels for 844,000 species-level and 705,000 subspecies-
level taxonomic concepts spanning across 151 checklists 
of birds published over 125 years. The database also tracks 
the extensional relationships between taxonomic concepts 
(Franz and Peet 2009), such as inclusion, inverse inclusion, 
equivalence, overlap, and exclusion. This added informa-
tion facilitates the recognition of 38,755 taxonomically dis-
tinct concept “clusters”—i.e., uses of taxonomic names that 
correspond to the same circumscription of a taxon. An anal-
ysis of the Avibase data furthermore shows that only 11 of 
19,260 (~1 in 1750) taxonomic name:concept combinations 
are both syntactically and semantically unique, i.e., these 
combinations have a symbol:reference cardinality of 1:1 
across the entire Avibase taxonomic information environ-
ment. In all other cases, either one taxonomic name string 
has multiple incongruent meanings or several different 
name strings have one congruent meaning. In either case, 
this means that additional, human-facilitated contextual 
9 Figure  2 illustrates the relationship between these two taxon con-
cepts.
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framing is needed to achieve precise name:concept 
assignments.
Returning to the theme of big data trajectories, we sug-
gest that several special conditions may have catalyzed 
the (historically) early shift towards more precise syn-
tactic design for taxonomic information in Avibase. For 
instance, Avibase focuses primarily on representing classi-
fications below the family level, where precise reference is 
often regarded as critical (Peterson and Navarro-Sigüenza 
1999). The database must accommodate one or more new 
taxonomies each year, published as updated checklists by 
different global or regional authorities such as the Ameri-
can Ornithologists’ Union or the International Ornithologi-
cal Committee. Invariably, there are significant changes in 
name usage across checklists. To reduce the complexity 
of the task, each represented checklist is a coherent, time-
stamped perspective with a simple and consistent data for-
mat. Avibase tracks neither feature-based circumscriptions 
nor individual specimen data. There is immense scientific 
and public use of these evolving taxonomies, whose syntac-
tic and semantic complexities rapidly exceed an individual 
human’s cognitive abilities for name:concept reconcilia-
tion. It is as if for once humans were “put in the shoes of 
computers,” and realized that the desired multi-taxonomy 
aggregation services could only be obtained through more 
context-aware name usage identifiers.
Pragmatic Solution: Analyzing Ambiguity 
in Context
Adding a standardized suffix to taxonomic names disam-
biguates taxonomic concepts by extending their internal 
syntax in order to replace the contextual information typi-
cally used by human readers (Rosenberg 2014). However, 
even if this new convention could be universally imple-
mented, it would not solve the problem of disambiguating 
all name usages and taxonomic concepts published in the 
past. In order to incorporate the massive legacy data about 
specimens from the historical literature, it seems neces-
sary to introduce some sort of natural language process-
ing approach—i.e., use computational algorithms to make 
inferences about intended meanings based on textual infor-
mation surrounding particular uses of names (Cui et  al. 
2016; Gandy et al. 2016). Thus far in the article, we have 
considered the semantics of taxonomic names largely in 
the already tame context of aggregating pre-existing data 
records. When we turn to look at taxonomic names “in the 
wild,” it turns out that even Berendsohn’s (1995) “sec.” 
convention is inadequate to disambiguate the full range of 
entities a taxonomic name can symbolize. In particular, 
it is quite common for biologists to use a name to ascribe 
properties like stability or instability to a trajectory of 
taxonomic concepts over time. As a result, the pragmatic 
context of a taxonomic name can demand one of several 
possible models for semantic disambiguation.
Consider a few possible statements taxonomists might 
say or write to their colleagues, each of which are perfectly 
adequate instances of English in an appropriate context.10 
(1) “A. virginicus is in cabinet 5, shelf 3.” (2) “A. virginicus 
is specimen LINN 1211.12.” (3) “A. virginicus occurs only 
in the eastern United States.” (4) “Radford, Ahles, and 
Bell’s (1986) definition of A. virginicus was based on the 
biological species concept.” (5) “Although initially poorly 
understood, A. virginicus has settled into a stable definition 
as a result of extensive study over the past five decades.” In 
each case, the same name string “A. virginicus” symbolizes 
the following referents: (1) a collection of one or more 
specimens, (2) the designated type specimen for the species 
name (epithet), (3) the taxon itself (as recognized at the 
time), (4) a particular taxonomic concept, and (5) a tempo-
ral sequence of multiple taxonomic concepts.
While sentences (1) and (2) are more colloquial and 
unlikely to show up in the scientific literature, 11 instances 
of sentences like (3)–(5) are highly common in the pub-
lished systematic literature, especially when legacy and 
new, taxonomically referenced information is brought 
together (e.g., Gratton et al. 2016).
In linguistic terms, these cases illustrate how biologists 
use the taxonomic name A. virginicus as a metonym to 
stand for a variety of related entities. Metonymy is “a figure 
of speech consisting of the use of the name of one thing for 
that of another of which it is an attribute or with which it is 
associated (as ‘crown’ in ‘lands belonging to the crown’)” 
(Merriam-Webster 2016). Most importantly for our pur-
poses, use (5) for taxonomic names shows how natural lan-
guage “in the wild” invokes meanings that go beyond the 
immediate expressive capacity of the extended taxonomic 
concept label syntax, i.e., [name] sec. [source].
Cognitive Pragmatics for Taxonomic Names
In the face of ambiguity about the identification of data, 
a common response among biodiversity informaticians is 
to push for a single, universal system that applies unique 
names to each lowest-level unit of data (cf. Godfray 2002). 
The issue of theory-dependence here operates at one level 
of composition higher: given a system of unique identi-
fiers for each physical specimen, there is still significant 
10 These statements are hypothetical examples and should not be 
taken as necessarily true.
11 Although see Figures  3C and 3D in Remsen (2016) for a visual 
analog to sentence (2).
107Taxonomy for Humans or Computers? Cognitive Pragmatics for Big Data 
1 3
ambiguity about how to group those specimen records into 
biologically relevant units. One can imagine reiterating 
the same response, then, at the level of taxonomic nomen-
clature: implement a new or revised set of nomenclatural 
rules so that names encode all the information needed to 
disambiguate which taxonomic concept the author is using. 
This strategy reflects a broader stance that ambiguity is 
generally a hindrance to science and that a universal sys-
tem of standards and practices that minimizes ambiguity is 
both possible and preferable. This stance takes for granted 
that the validity of the system of standards and practices is 
largely independent of the ongoing results of the research 
it facilitates. Theory-dependence in data threatens this sta-
bility insofar as it introduces conflict and uncertainty into 
the basic properties of the data, including their identity and 
semantics. This challenges a familiar conception of sci-
ence, and of big data trajectories in particular, as making 
consistent progress through the accumulation of ever more 
bits of data (cf. Kuhn 1996[1962]).
A positive role for ambiguity in this regard is to enable 
terms to mediate between conflicting positions by provid-
ing a common ground that leaves undecided key issues for 
debate or negotiation. Indeed, this is one virtue of taxo-
nomic names such as A. virginicus, which do not specify 
the associated taxonomic concept or species category being 
invoked. Anchoring a name ostensively using a type speci-
men provides a common ground for scientific debate over 
the nature of the taxon without building a resolution to that 
debate into the name itself. A system for identifying taxo-
nomic concepts that replaced Linnaeus’s binomial system 
with a 128-bit sequence of zeroes and ones would achieve a 
new level of precision at the cost of our ability as humans 
to use taxonomic names to mediate disputes over which 
taxonomic concept is correct.12 We also saw how multiple 
uses of the name as a metonym reflect the expressive power 
enabled by ambiguity that would be eliminated by embrac-
ing a more restrictive syntax.
In this vein, we argue that any given nomenclatural 
convention carries one or more cognitive trade-offs for 
its users. From Linnaeus onward, the efficiency, stability, 
and precision of communication have been leading moti-
vations for the design and revision of practices and rules 
for biological nomenclature (Stevens 2002; Ogilvie 2003; 
Dayrat 2010; Dietz 2012; Müller-Wille and Charmantier 
2012; Witteveen 2015b). For example, one reason Lin-
naeus was motivated to formalize the binomial system was 
to escape a common expectation at the time that species-
level names would include enough descriptive information 
12 Note that Berendsohn’s extended syntax maintains coherence with 
existing practices in taxonomy by adding onto the binomial system 
rather than replacing it wholesale.
to distinguish the purported species from all con-generic 
members (Cain 1958; Stearn 1959; Jansonius 1981). As 
European explorers began to collect ever more specimens 
from diverse sections of the tree of life, this expectation 
forced taxonomists to keep adding more descriptive con-
tent to species-level names, thereby allowing them to ade-
quately distinguish their meanings from those of presumed 
close relatives. For example, between 1738 and 1753 Lin-
naeus was forced to expand the name string “Plantago 
foliis ovatis glabris” into “Plantago folios ovaries glares, 
nudo scapo tereti, spica flosculis imbricatis.” Shortly there-
after, he simplified it to the more manageable “Plantago 
major” (Jansonius 1981).
Biologists’ taxonomic naming practices are thus a par-
ticularly regimented example of what is arguably a very 
general trade-off between ambiguity and precision in 
human language (Zipf 1949; Atran 1998; Levinson 2000; 
Wilson and Sperber 2012). Many linguists and philoso-
phers have assumed that the optimal design for a commu-
nication system is perfect semantic precision, such that 
each word corresponds to only one possible meaning (e.g., 
Chomsky 2002). However, when people share elements of 
their environmental context, this precision actually leads 
to inefficient redundancies. According to Piantadosi et  al. 
(2012, p. 281; emphasis in original), “ambiguity is in fact 
a desirable property of communication systems, precisely 
because it allows for a communication system which is 
‘short and simple.’” These authors argue for “two benefi-
cial properties of ambiguity: first, where context is inform-
ative about meaning, unambiguous language is partly 
redundant with the context and therefore inefficient; and 
second, ambiguity allows the re-use of words and sounds 
which are more easily produced or understood” (Piantadosi 
et al. 2012, p. 281).
Although Piantadosi et al. (2012) examine the value of 
ambiguity in a static or equilibrium context across whole 
languages, their reasoning should also have implications for 
the dynamics of linguistic change. In this vein, the attempt 
to assemble big data in systematics is likely to destabilize 
taxonomic nomenclature by forcing new compromises 
between the divergent cognitive abilities of humans and 
computers to parse the context-specific meanings of taxo-
nomic names. In other words, the drive to big data will 
force the issue of whether taxonomy is best designed for 
humans or for computers.
While expert taxonomists have successfully dealt with 
the semantic ambiguities of names for centuries, the strate-
gies they have developed do not scale well across millions 
of biological entities compounded by hundreds of years of 
history. Indeed, an important part of taxonomists’ expertise 
lies in having committed to memory the historical sequence 
of taxonomic revisions and nomenclatural relationships 
for some domain of interest, along with the idiosyncrasies 
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of collections housed at different institutions. Thus, when 
experts read a published article about some taxonomic 
group, they are typically able to use contextual clues from 
the text plus their extensive, fine-tuned background knowl-
edge of the domain to correctly parse the authors’ name 
usages and concepts of the corresponding taxa. Unfor-
tunately, relying on context to resolve ambiguity poses a 
profound challenge for computers, which presently lack 
humans’ cognitive skills for making complex inferences 
about the intended meanings of names.
In the opposite direction, computational logic is not 
immediately optimized for human communication and 
reasoning about taxonomic entities. Hypothetically speak-
ing, if the objective is to logically represent a transition 
between taxonomic concepts over time, computers have no 
need to reuse any symbols for references authored at sep-
arate times. Moreover, the symbols would not need to be 
mono- or binomial, or of limited length and thereby eas-
ily pronounceable and memorable for humans. Rank end-
ings would not have to be inherently embedded in the sym-
bols, as this information could be allocated in an associated 
table. Instead it would be perfectly suitable in the “eyes” 
of computational representation to assign (e.g.) globally 
unique 128-bit strings for every name usage. Handling tril-
lions of such unique symbols to account for taxonomic con-
cepts in the systematic knowledge domain would be well 
within reach in terms of computational processing capacity.
Assigning unique identifiers to taxonomic concepts in 
this way may approximate optimality for computers, but 
it does so at the expense of rendering human communica-
tion about taxonomic names, referents, and provenance far 
more difficult. In particular, the positive scientific roles 
served by the ambiguity of taxonomic names would be 
lost or would have to be reconstructed using a different 
syntactic convention. Hence, we need to ask: is there an 
attainable and desirable middle-ground solution? Is the 
“best of both worlds”—i.e., taxonomic symbols that are 
maximally aligned with human cognitive capacities yet 
that are also precisely framed for logic-based represen-
tation and reasoning—an option? In order to answer this 
question, we need to make explicit the trade-offs between 
precision and ambiguity for systems used by both humans 
and computers to identify and classify data. Given the 
default tendency of many scientists and philosophers to 
prefer precision, this implies the need for new attention to 
the positive roles that ambiguity plays in scientific com-
munication and inquiry.
Conclusion
Criticism of the big data movement has largely focused on 
showing that more is not necessarily better, in the sense 
that data do not always maintain their value when taken 
out of their immediate context of use and aggregated 
together. Nonetheless, there is a value and even impera-
tive to pursuing big data in many fields, such as for bio-
diversity studies. The next question, then, is how to incor-
porate an awareness of aggregation pitfalls into the design 
of the infrastructure and institutions supporting a group’s 
big data trajectory. One common strategy aims to minimize 
aggregation pitfalls by increasing the precision of our con-
ventions for identifying and classifying data. The theory-
dependence of specimen data is not simply an obstacle for 
aggregation, however, because it also reflects the status 
of taxonomic concepts as scientific hypotheses subject to 
continuing research and debate. We argued for the positive 
roles that ambiguity can play in this regard as an efficient 
way of symbolizing multiple aspects of taxa and mediat-
ing between different conceptions of their nature. We also 
argued that trade-offs between precision and ambiguity 
are a general feature of taxonomic nomenclature given the 
multiple functions taxonomic names serve in biological 
research. Ambiguity is therefore not purely an obstacle to 
scientific progress, but has positive contributions to make 
that should be balanced against precision in the design of 
data infrastructure.
The existence of trade-offs between precision and ambi-
guity is connected to fundamental questions about the 
nature of scientific change in the history, philosophy, and 
social studies of science. Behind many of the promises 
made for big data is the assumption that collecting more 
data can lead to major changes in science without challeng-
ing the meaning or value of that same data. In other words, 
very few scientists and funding agencies engaged in build-
ing huge new databases expect to simply throw them away 
once those databases have generated their important new 
results.
This reflects a familiar understanding of scientific 
progress as a steady accumulation of knowledge: “If sci-
ence is the constellation of facts, theories, and methods 
collected in current texts, then scientists are the men 
who, successfully or not, have striven to contribute one 
or another element to that particular constellation. Sci-
entific development becomes the piecemeal process by 
which these items have been added, singly and in com-
bination, to the ever growing stockpile that constitutes 
scientific technique and knowledge” (Kuhn 1996[1962]), 
p.  2). What is new here in the context of big data is 
that informatics has brought a conceptual precision to 
the handling and use of data that has historically been 
applied mainly  to the analysis of scientific theories. 
What Kuhn showed us, however, is that the develop-
ment of science over time includes discontinuities, con-
tradictions, and shifts in perspective that cannot be dis-
missed as simply the ignorance, errors, or superstition of 
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the past. Even the most logically precise understanding 
afforded by our current knowledge, then, is not a suffi-
cient guide to the meaning and value of past or future 
data.
A higher synthesis of the virtues of precision and 
ambiguity would go beyond the demonstration of trade-
offs to characterize their systematic interdependence 
within the circumstances of a big data trajectory. For 
example, making explicit taxonomic concept labels a uni-
versal standard could serve as the basis for a fruitful syn-
ergy between the syntactic and pragmatic approaches we 
described. Since being able to make assertions about how 
taxonomic concepts have changed over time is essential 
for biologists to describe advances in empirical support 
for emerging classificatory patterns across multiple revi-
sions, it would be useful to express these changes in for-
mal terms. Taxonomic concept labels make this possible 
by allowing one to reconstruct claims about how scien-
tific knowledge about a taxonomic “region” has changed 
in terms of logical relations between taxonomic concepts 
(Fig.  2), and leverage these assertions for semi-auto-
mated, scalable logic applications (Cui et al. 2016; Franz 
et al. 2016b, c).
Similarly, when scientists regiment natural language 
by adopting new syntactic or semantic conventions, it has 
downstream effects on the pragmatics of future discourse. 
For example, adopting Berendsohn’s (1995) “sec.” exten-
sion to traditional nomenclature would force the authors 
of a new study to routinely decide, with every name 
usage, whether they are (1) authoring a concept with rel-
evantly new semantics, (2) referring to a name usage that 
they concur with (perhaps inaccurately) but that is “by 
someone else,” or (3) not really referring to any particu-
lar usage (explicitly wanting to commit to non-precision). 
Only (1) requires coining a new identifier, but deciding 
whether that is merited or not is possibly a new burden, 
and a subject not yet well explored. In other words, the 
opportunity to specify name usages more precisely trans-
lates into a heightened responsibility, or demand, to make 
one’s speaker role more conscious and explicit. As these 
examples suggest, interesting and important challenges for 
designing the data infrastructures of science arise where 
the virtues of precision and ambiguity interact. Pursuing 
a deeper understanding of the trade-offs and synthesis of 
these two aspects of scientific language therefore offers a 
next step for the productive critique and design of big data 
systems.
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